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SYMPOSIUM 
PATTERSON V. MCLEAN 
This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits 
discrimination by private parties. The three articles which follow analyze 
what the authors consider to be the cruc(al implications of that reargu-
ment. In the introductory piece, Professor Farber identifies three issues 
which lie at the heart of Patterson: Must statutes be construed to conform 
to the intent of the drafters? Does legislative inaction provide reliable 
guidance to interpreters of statutes? And should the nature of the claim at 
issue - here a claim of civil rights - influence the interpreters? On this 
last point, Professor Farber argues that public values must be relevant to 
statutory interpretation and that judges should explicitly be guided by 
them. 
Professor Aleinikoff then examines in depth the first issue raised by 
Professor Farber. Using metaphors of the archeological and the nautical 
Professor Aleinikoff describes theories of originalism and their application 
to statutory interpretation. Concluding that there are nonoriginalist (or 
nonarcheological) elements implicit in these theories, he proceeds to con-
sider how an explicitly nonoriginalist (or nautical) theory of interpretation 
might work He concludes by commenting on the application of such a 
theory to Patterson. 
In the final article, Professor Eskridge addresses the issue of how legis-
lative inaction should affect statutory interpretation. He begins by con-
structing a detailed analysis of the Court's legislative inaction cases, 
arguing that the case law is much more coherent than previous analysts 
have suggested. Professor Eskridge then considers Justice Scalia's critique 
of that case law and provides support for Justice Scalia's views by distin-
guishing actual and presumed legislative intent, arguing that, based on a 
conception of actual intent, Justice Scalia's arguments have great persua-
sive power. However, Professor Eskridge suggests presumed intent may be 
the more accurate basis for statutory interpretation, and he concludes that 
on such a basis the guidance provided by legislative silence in the Patter-
son context is compelling. 
While the concerns of the authors and the stances they adopt on these 
issues may vary, the foundational questions raised by Patterson are recog-
nized by them all: What theory of interpretation, what sources of guid-
ance, and what role for interpreters will provide consistency, stability, and 
coherence in a pluralist, democratic legal system? 
1 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 
LEGISLATIVE INACTION, AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
Daniel A. Farber* 
On April 25, 1988, the Supreme Court ordered reargument in Pat- . 
terson v. McLean Credit Union. 1 Such routine procedural orders do 
not ordinarily receive widespread public attention unless a case is al-
ready in the limelight. Patterson was a seemingly routine case, in 
which the major issue was whether racially motivated harassment of 
an employee is actionable under a Reconstruction-era statute, 42 
U.S.C. section 1981.2 Not an insignificant question, surely, but also 
not a headline grabber. And yet, the Court's reargument order re-
ceived front-page treatment and greatly alarmed many civil rights ac-
tivists. 3 The reason for all this attention was that the order did more 
than set the case for reargument. It also directed the parties to address 
an issue no one had previously raised in the case: whether to overrule 
Runyon v. McCrary, 4 which held that section 1981 prohibits discrimi-
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. - Ed. I would like to 
thank Doug Baird, Bill Eskridge, Dianne Farber, Phil Frickey, Hank Greely, Richard Posner, 
David Shapiro, Suzanna Sherry, and Steve Y eazell for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. 108 s. Ct. 1419 (1988). 
2. The relevant statutory language provides that "[a]ll persons ..• shall have the same right 
•.• to make and enforce contracts ••. as is enjoyed by white citizens •••• " The court of appeals 
held that racial harassment is not cognizable under§ 1981. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986). 
3. For example, the decision was the leading story in the next day's New York Times. Court, 
5-4, Votes To Restudy Rights in Minority Suits. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 6. The 
subtitle was "Extraordinary Action Could Lead to Retrenchment on Earlier Protections." Ac-
cording to Newsweek, "liberals on and off the court were aghast at their vision of a new conserva-
tive majority, created when Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the bench in February, running 
roughshod over legal precedents." Why Open a Closed Case? Upheaval on the Court, Newsweek, 
May 9, 1988, at 71. The New Republic commented that 
[w]ith so many liberal doctrines now woven into "the fabric of our law," liberals like the 
idea that they should be preserved even if most justices think they are wrong. Conservatives 
complain that this notion turns the Supreme Court into a one-way legal ratchet: liberal 
majorities add new doctrines but conservative majorities can't subtract them. How much 
respect the Court should give its own past rulings is a perennial question that will be para-
mount in the coming years. Certainly, though, it represents an extreme approach for the 
Court to announce it has decided to reopen an old controversy when nobody has even asked 
it to do so. 
''TRB," The Fifth Man, The New Republic, May 16, 1988, at 4, 42; see also Greenberg, Distres-
sing Signals from the Court, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1988, at 31, col. 2; Neuborne, The Run on 
Runyon: Will Stare Decisis Become Bankrupt?. Legal Times, May 9, 1988, at 16. Concerns 
about the opinion are not, however, limited to liberals. Newsweek quotes a prominent conserva-
tive law professor as saying, "The decisions involved here haven't done any great damage to the 
legal system, and in fact, they may have done some good • • • . It seems a very academic exercise 
to say those cases are now questionable." Newsweek, supra. 
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon involved racial discrimination by private schools. The lower 
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nation by private parties as well as discrimination by state 
governments. 
In practical terms, Runyon is only a moderately significant deci-
sion. With the notable exception of discrimination by private schools, 
most forms of discrimination that can be reached under Runyon can 
also be reached under other statutes. 5 So it was not the potential prac-
tical impact of overruling Runyon that sparked public interest. 
Rather, it was the Justices' seeming willingness for the first time to 
overrule a civil rights precedent and thereby retreat from the Court's 
support for racial equality. 
The reargument order was contested by two forceful dissents writ-
ten by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissents which in turn led the 
five-member majority to issue a per curiam reply. The dissenters ar-
gued that the majority's action was unwarranted given both the failure 
of Congress to overrule Runyon and the longstanding public policy 
against racial discrimination. 
The dissenting and majority opinions raise intriguing questions 
with implications which go far beyond the issues raised in litigation. 
My remarks will be directed primarily to these broader issues. Specifi-
cally, I will address three of the issues raised by Patterson and Runyon. 
Part I will consider the relevance of original intent to issues of statu-
tory construction such as that involved in Runyon. Now that the 
Court has decided to revisit Runyon, should it consider only the origi-
nal understanding6 of section 1981, or should it also consider the cur-
rent legislative consensus against racial discrimination? The Patterson 
dissenters found the fact that Congress has left Runyon intact an indi-
cation of that consensus. The majority apparently did not. Part II 
will therefore consider whether legislative silence is a relevant factor in 
applying stare decisis. Here, I will sometimes invoke economic meth-
courts had anticipated the Runyon holding. See c. ABERNATHY, ClvIL RIGHTS: CASES AND 
MATERIAlS 265-76 (1980). 
5. This overlap may present some problems in coordinating§ 1981 remedies with those pro-
vided by other statutes. See c. ABERNATHY, supra note 4, at 270-72; T. EISENBERG, CIVIL 
RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIAlS 874-77 (2d ed. 1987). These coordination 
problems are the major practical difficulty created by Runyon. Overruling Runyon would not, 
however, eliminate these problems because, like § 1981, the other statutes also cover state 
governments. 
6. There is currently a dispute about whether statutory interpretation should focus on the 
intent of the legislature or on the meaning of the statute to the reasonable reader of the time. For 
discussion of this issue and citations to opposing views, see Easterbrook, The Role of Original 
Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 59 (1988); Farber & Frickey, 
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 452-61 (1988). This debate is not 
relevant to the issues discussed in this essay. My use of the phrase "original understanding" is 
deliberately ambiguous as to whether it is the understanding of the legislators or the citizenry 
that counts. 
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odology, in the spirit of a recently developed approach to the study of 
political institutions known as public choice theory. 7 I will not rely 
exclusively on this approach, nor do I claim that economic methodol-
ogy is either descriptively or normatively complete as a method of 
analysis. Economic analysis can, however, be helpful in attempting to 
unravel some of the complexities of these problems. Finally, I will 
discuss whether considerations of public policy should play a greater 
role in deciding whether to overrule a precedent than in the initial 
decision on an issue of statutory construction. The dissenters viewed 
the national commitment against racial discrimination as relevant to 
the question of reopening Runyon. The majority retorted that this ar-
gument essentially gave civil rights litigants an unjustified advantage 
over other litigants. This dispute about the meaning of principled 
decisionmaking is the subject of Part III. 
Each of these issues raises· deep jurisprudential problems, and I 
make no pretense of offering a definitive treatment. I merely wish to 
identify those problems as a basis for continuing investigation and 
debate. 
I. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
'The Runyon Court found little difficulty in construing section 1981 
as reaching private conduct. Indeed, the Court found that this conclu-
sion was already "well established" on the basis of prior decisions in-
volving section 1981.8 Runyon was also supported by the analogous 
holding regarding section 1982 in an open-housing case, Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co.,9 which squarely held section 1982 applicable to 
private housing discrimination. The two concurring opinions in Run-
yon suggested that the Court's original construction of these two sec-
tions might have been unsound but that stare decisis barred 
reconsideration of that question. 10 
In his dissenting opinion in Runyon, Justice White argued that 
Jones was distinguishable because section 1981 had a different statu-
tory origin. According to Justice White, section 1981, unlike section 
1982, did not originate as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, though 
that statute contained very similar language. Rather, Justice White 
7. The reader who is unfamiliar with public choice theory will find useful articles in Sympo-
sium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167-518 (1988). 
8. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168. 
9. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
10. See 427 U.S. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The applicability of§ 1981 to private con-
tracts has been considered maturely and recently, and I do not feel free to disregard these prece-
dents."); 427 U.S. at 189, 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("For the Court now to overrule Jones 
would be a significant step backwards •.•. ")(footnote omitted). 
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traced section 1981 to an 1870 statute. The 1870 statute was based on 
the fourteenth amendment, unlike the 1866 Act, which was based on 
the thirteenth amendment. 11 The fourteenth amendment roots of the 
1870 statute at issue in Runyon, White argued, supported an interpre-
tation requiring a finding of state action. 
The Runyon majority did not contest Justice White's reading of the 
1870 statute. Instead, the majority argued that the 1870 language and 
the 1866 language had coalesced into the current section, as part of an 
1874 effort at codifying federal law.12 Thus, the correctness of Justice 
White's argument turned on the question whether in 1874, while at-
tempting to codify prior law, Congress had repealed the relevant lan-
guage from the 1866 Act and had reenacted the similar language from 
1870. If the 1874 revision did not affect the portion of the 1866 Act 
considered in Jones, then Jones was distinguishable. 
The strongest support for White's interpretation is the historical 
note to section 1981 accompanying the 1874 revision, which men-
tioned the 1870 statute but not the 1866 statute. But the limited au-
thority of the revisers, which did not include the power to make 
substantive legal changes, undermines this support. The Runyon 
Court declined to "attribute to Congress an intent to repeal a major 
piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of an unexplained 
omission from the revisers' marginal notes."13 
Because the majority's interpretation assumes that the 1866 statute 
applied to private conduct, the only question is whether the current 
statute derives from the 1866 or the 1870 enactment. But it is also 
possible to argue with considerable force that the Court's understand-
ing of the 1866 statute was itself mistaken.14 Justice White, consider-
ing himself bound by the contrary holding regarding section 1982 in 
Jones, left this question unaddressed. Because the Patterson Court did 
not request argument about Jones and because none of the dissenting 
Justices seem to think the validity of Jones is in question, the Patterson 
order presumably does not reopen the Jones Court's interpretation of 
11. 427 U.S. at 195-211 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also relied on the language of 
the provision, 427 U.S. at 193-95, but to my mind the language is by no means unambiguous. 
Although Justice White's reading of the "right" to contract as a reference to discriminatory state 
laws i:I certainly plausible, it is not uncommon for the word "right" to be used in other ways. 
For example, if a private university were to refuse to hire someone because of that person's 
political views, it would not be at all odd for a critic to say that the individual had a "right" to be 
considered on the merits, without reference to political factors. 
12. 427 U.S. at 168 n.8. 
13. 427 U.S. at 169 n.8. 
14. Some noted historical authorities have taken this position. The historical evidence is 
exhaustively reviewed inc. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, pt. 1, 1207-300 (1971). 
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the 1866 statute.15 If the viability of Jones is not currently at issue, the 
argument for overruling Runyon turns solely upon Justice White's ar-
gument for distinguishing the two cases. 
Whatever support for White's view that can be gleaned from the 
notes of the 1874 codification, the meager historical evidence concern-
ing congressional motivation renders an interpretation of the historical 
record intrinsically uncertain. This raises an important issue regard-
ing statutory interpretation: Where the evidence of the original under-
standing is unclear, must a judge pick the most probable interpretation 
of the evidence, or may the judge consider other factors as well? The 
question, in short, is whether statutory interpretation is strictly gov-
erned by originalism. 
Some of the standard arguments made against originalism in con-
stitutional law16 also apply in the statutory context, 17 particularly 
where the statutory language is broad and the statute is old. As with 
constitutional provisions, determining the original understanding of an 
old statute may be more difficult because of gaps in the historical rec-
ord, because of the divergent views of those involved in making the 
crucial legislative decisions, and because of changes in linguistic usage 
and cultural contexts. Moreover, as with constitutional provisions, 
the original understanding of a broadly worded statute can be defined 
at various levels of generality, leading to potentially different results. 
Thus, originalist analysis may be incapable of answering some funda-
mental questions, at which point recourse to some other interpretative 
approach is necessary. Hence, at least when originalism can provide 
no answer, recourse to nonoriginalist considerations seems clearly ap-
propriate if not imperative. 
There seems to be no escape from nonoriginalism when the origi-
nal understanding is entirely indeterminate.18 For example, if we as-
signed equal probabilities to two opposing views of the historical 
record, we would necessarily have to tum to some alternative method 
15. Also, the Patterson order specifically refers to § 1981, while Jones involved § 1982. 108 
S. Ct. at 1420. This seems to be another indication that the validity of Jones is not currently in 
question. 
16. For a survey of the literature, see D. Farber & S. Sherry, A History of the American 
Constitution ch. 14 (forthcoming 1989). 
17. The problem of originalism in statutory cases is closely linked with a deeper question 
about the appropriateness of formalism in the statutory area. Some important scholarship has 
begun to address this problem. See Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpreta· 
tion of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. R.Es. L. REV. 179 (1986-1987); Weisberg, The 
Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 232-37 
(1983); Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
18. In such cases, as Professor Tribe observes, the court must invoke some "background 
principle" to decide the case. See Tribe, Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Three Axioms, l l 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 51, 55 (1988). 
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of interpretation. The result should not be radically different if we 
were then to locate a small shred of relevant historical evidence, so 
that instead of viewing the question as a 50-50 bet, we would now bet 
51-49 in favor of the truth of one historical view. If we had powerful, 
nonoriginalist reasons for favoring the less probable interpretation 
when it was an even bet, we would be foolish to abandon that position 
based on a trivial piece of additional historical evidence.19 Indeed, 
basing interpretations solely on definitional probabilities while ignor-
ing the other values at stake would violate accepted models for ra-
tional decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty.20 
Like the hypothetical case of the 51-49 bet, Runyon was a rela-
tively easy case for applying nonoriginalism, given Justice White's 
concession that the 1866 statute applied to private discriminatory 
acts.21 The only controversy remaining in the wake of this concession 
concerns the original understanding of the 1874 revision. And given 
the relatively thin historical record on that revision, recourse to non-
originalist considerations was clearly appropriate. Furthermore, racial 
equality, as I will discuss later, is in this context as noncontroversial a 
consideration as one could hope to find.22 To put it more bluntly, it is 
dubious that the legality of discriminatory private schools today 
should tum on the marginal annotations of statutory revisers a cen-
tury ago. Thus, the Runyon Court was on solid ground in rejecting 
White's meager historical evidence for his interpretation. Neverthe-
less, given the possibility that the present Court might not agree with 
this reading of section 1981 on the merits, it is also important to con-
sider the bearing of stare decisis on Patterson. That is the subject of 
the next two sections. 
19. An originalist might retort that judicial legitimacy in statutory cases derives entirely 
from the original intent of the legislature. Hence, any hint as to original intent must be followed 
without deviation. A full discussion of this argument would go beyond the scope of this essay, 
but I believe that a useful response could be shaped along Rawlsian lines. Behind the Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance, suppose that individuals do not know if they will tum out to be enacting 
legislators or judges construing legislation. What rules would they agree on as fair? Strict 
originalism seems a highly implausible answer. 
20. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 6, at 461-65. 
21. When the original understanding seems clear, bringing current public values to bear be-
comes much more problematic. The question of statutory originalism also raises some difficult 
issues about how the courts can identify public values in areas of public controversy. For discus-
sion of this problem, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 
(1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation]; Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory In-
terpretation (forthcoming) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values]; Farber & Frickey, The Juris-
prudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873, 909-11 (1987); Sunstein, Factions, Se/f-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271 (1986). 
22. See text at notes 59-61 infra. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE INACTION AND STARE DECISIS 
In opposing reargument in Patterson, Justice Blackmun relied 
heavily on the doctrine that stare decisis applies with special force in 
matters of statutory interpretation.23 The Court's reading of a statute 
is thought to be particularly invulnerable when, as in Runyon itself, 
Congress has rejected attempts to reverse the Court's interpretation. 
Unimpressed, the Patterson majority noted that the Court has "explic· 
itly overruled statutory precedents in a host of cases" and that stare 
decisis is a "principle of policy and not a mechanical formula."24 
Thus, the majority's decision to rehear the case must reflect a view 
that congressional silence is not an absolute bar to reconsidering past 
opinions. But the majority did not address the question of whether 
congressional silence is entitled to significant weight in deciding stare 
decisis issues, and, of course, there was no reason for the majority to 
do so in the context of an order for reargument. The weight to be 
given congressional silence, then, remains an open issue, which will 
probably figure in the ultimate resolution of the case. 
Patterson thus seems likely to occasion a continuation of the debate 
begun in Johnson v. Transportation Agency 25 about the relevance of 
the "sounds of silence" to stare decisis issues.26 Johnson involved an 
affirmative action issue under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.27 
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued in favor of overruling a previous deci· 
sion,28 which had allowed affirmative action under some circum· 
stances. 29 The majority responded that "Congress has not amended 
the statute to reject our construction, nor have any such amendments 
even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our interpreta· 
tion was correct."3° Calling on the majority to abandon the "canard" 
of "vindication by congressional inaction,"31 Justice Scalia launched a 
23. For background concerning this doctrine, see W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 303-07 
(1988). An extensive discussion of the Court's previous application of this doctrine can be found 
in Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 16 GEO. L. R.Ev. 1361 (1988). A similar approach 
apparently prevails in Britain. See A. PATERSON, THE LAW LoRDS 156-58 (1982). 
24. 108 S. Ct. at 1420-21 (citations omitted). 
25. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
26. The musical allusion derives from Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the 
Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982). For background on 
the issue, see W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 23, at 307-22. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
28. United Steelworkers, v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
29. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1473-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
30. 107 S. Ct. at 1451, n.7. 
31. 107 S. Ct. at 1473. 
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vigorous attack on the presumption that congressional silence consti-
tutes approval of the Court's interpretation of a statute. 
Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson essentially makes two argu-
ments. First, he argues that congressional failure to act will often be 
explained by factors other than approval of the Court's decision. Sec-
ond, he suggests that the presumptions rest "on the patently false 
premise that the correctness of statutory ·construction is to be mea-
sured by what the current Congress desires, rather than by what the 
law as enacted meant."32 Apart from whatever support from fellow 
Justices may be reflected in the Patterson reargument order, Justice 
Scalia's view is shared by Judge Frank Easterbrook and other 
scholars. 33 
The language used in statutory interpretation opinions is notori-
ously wooden. There may well be opinions treating congressional si- · 
lence as a completely dispositive event, as if Congress had amended 
the law in line with the Court's decision. Against this mechanistic 
treatment of congressional silence, Justice Scalia's arguments are pow-
erful. But it is doubtful that the Court has ever really embraced such a 
mechanical approach to the problem. The interesting question, in any 
event, is whether congressional silence should be given significant 
weight in considering stare decisis issues. On that point, Scalia's argu-
ments are less convincing. 
The first question Scalia raises is whether congressional silence is a 
valid indicator of congressional approval. As he points out, there are a 
number of reasons why Congress might fail to act even though a ma-
jority of its members disapprove of a judicial decision. Perhaps the 
most notable reason is the power of committees and party leaders to 
control the congressional agenda. 34 For reasons also relating to 
agenda control, a shift in coalitions can also block measures to over-
turn a judicial interpretation, even though the statute would not have 
initially passed if the Court's later interpretation had been foreseen. 35 
32. 107 S. Ct. at 1472-73. Justice Scalia made somewhat similar arguments in his dissent in 
United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2075 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33. See Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 
(1988); Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 65 N.C. L. REV. 367, 388-90 (1987); Posner, Economics, 
Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 263, 275 (1982); 
Rees, Cathedrals Without Walls: A View from the Outside (Book Review), 61 TEXAS L. REV. 
347, 373-78 (1982) ("In cases where the judge's role is to apply and interpret laws that have been 
made by others, prior judicial opinions may contain highly persuasive arguments about what the 
laws mean, but they cannot relieve the judge of his obligation to decide."). 
34. For a formal model developing this point, see Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on 
Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell (Feb. 23, 1988) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
35. See Eskridge, Dynamic Interpretation, supra note 21, at 1524-25. 
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Thus, Justice Scalia is on solid ground when he suggests that con-
gressional silence can have many explanations. But of course, this is 
something that no one has questioned - including the majority in 
Johnson. 36 Silence is an imperfect signal of congressional approval. 
Nevertheless, silence clearly communicates some information about 
congressional approval. Because Congress will virtually never37 vote 
to overturn an interpretation it agrees with, its failure to overturn the 
statute increases the likelihood that Congress in fact agreed. Indeed, 
so long as silence is a more likely response when Congress affirma-
tively approves of the Court's interpretation than otherwise, 
probability theory indicates that, no matter how many other causes of 
congressional silence may exist, silence is still a signal of congressional 
approval. This can be shown with a formal Bayesian analysis, but an 
example may be more instructive. Consider two urns, one of which 
(um A) contains only white marbles, while the other (um B) contains 
equal numbers of black or white marbles. A marble is randomly cho-
sen from the two urns. It turns out to be white. Obviously, a white 
marble could have come from either um. Nevertheless, two out of 
three times, the white marble will have come from um A. (On the 
average, four drawings will produce two white marbles from um A, a 
white marble from um B, and a black marble from um B. Thus, on 
the average, twice as many white marbles will tum out to have been 
drawn from um A as um B.) So, even though the marble could have 
come from either um, it is still a meaningful indicator of the identity 
of the um. Similarly, although congressional silence could result from 
either congressional approval or other factors, it still increases the like-
lihood of congressional approval. It should, after all, be no surprise 
that evidence need not be completely reliable to be entitled to 
consideration. 
The real question then is not whether congressional silence carries 
information, but how much information it carries. Clearly, the answer 
depends on our appraisal of the plausibility of other possible explana-
tions for congressional silence. For example, in an area like civil pro-
cedure, to which Congress is quite inattentive, silence means little.38 
36. See 107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7. 
37. One can imagine situations in which a powerful minority might be able to attach such a 
provision as a rider to a measure that the majority would then feel compelled to pass. Also, if the 
minority's preferences were intense and the majority's were weak, the majority might give way, 
perhaps as part of a log-rolling deal. 
38. Perhaps this observation explains why the Court gave no thought to legislative silence in 
a recent case involving an arcane point of appellate practice, even though the result was to over-
turn a fifty-year-old interpretation of the governing statute. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. 
Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-42 (1988). 
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On the other hand, in a highly controversial area like affirmative ac-
tion, the Johnson majority was surely correct in stressing that not a 
single member of Congress introduced legislation to overturn the 
Court's previous decision. 39 Thus, although a careful appraisal of the 
circumstances is in order, it is neither logically impossible nor neces-
sarily difficult in practice to ·infer approval from legislative inaction. 
The harder question is whether congressional approval matters. 
The heart of Justice Scalia's argument is that any deviation from 
originalism is a betrayal of the original meaning of the measure.40 As 
Judge Easterbrook says with his customary clarity, "If courts become 
instruments by which packages are undone, laws will be harder to 
pass. Bargains must be kept to be believed, and inferences from legis-
lative inaction are a means by which bargains are broken."41 The as-
sumption, then, is that the original supporters of a statute would 
prefer courts to enforce the "statutory bargain" even at the cost of 
overruling precedent. 
This may well be true ex post (that is, viewing the matter after the 
fact). After the Court misconstrues a statute, some or all of its origi-
nal supporters might well prefer that the Court give no weight to legis-
lative silence or stare decisis itself. But, as Judge Easterbrook has 
suggested in another context, ex post analysis is often inappropriate 
because it ignores the prospective effects of legal decisions. 42 The 
proper analysis here is ex ante. In other words, we must ask what rule 
about legislative inaction would be preferred by the majority coalition 
at the time of the original enactment. 
One problem with Scalia's analysis is that it overestimates the im-
portance to legislators of having courts correct mistaken judicial inter-
pretations of statutes. Significant reasons exist . for doubting that 
legislators put absolute priority on ultimately obtaining correct inter-
39. See 107 S. Ct. at 1450 n.7. Professor Eskridge argues that the failure of Congress to 
respond to Weber may simply have been an indication that the groups benefitting from the deci-
sion were much better organized while the victims were amorphous and lacking in political clout. 
Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1410-11. This explanation seems implausible, for while it might well 
account for the failure of Congress actually to legislate in the area, it does not account for the 
failure of any member of Congress even to introduce a bill on the subject. It is not as if ideologi-
cal opponents of affirmative action were unrepresented in Congress in the years preceding 
Johnson. 
40. A quite different argument can also be made, which is that legislators are so bad at 
formulating policy that courts should pay as little attention to them as possible. While a full 
discussion of this point would take me far afield, I must say that I am not yet persuaded to place 
such a low value on democratic institutions. 
41. Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 429. The idea of viewing statutes as legislative deals 
originated in Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 · 
J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975). 
42. This is a major theme of Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The 
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984). 
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pretations. At the time of enactment, members of the winning coali-
tion have no way of knowing whether judicial mistakes will favor them 
(giving them more than the original "bargain") or injure them (giving 
them less than they bargained for). Provided courts make a good-faith 
effort to interpret statutes correctly, legislators can expect both kinds 
of mistakes to happen with equal likelihood, 43 so the expected cost of 
incorrect decisions as such is zero. 44 At this level of analysis, legisla-
tors are ex ante indifferent to judicial mistakes because they can expect 
the errors to balance out. 
Thus, from an ex ante perspective, judicial errors are a less serious 
concern to legislators than they would appear to be after the fact. 
Legislators do have some reasons to be concerned about prospective 
uncertainty in judicial interpretations. If the enacting legislators are 
risk-averse, they may have some reluctance to gamble on the direction 
of judicial error. There also may be social costs, such as increased 
litigation and difficulty in planning transactions, associated with un-
certainty about how statutes will be construed. ·Jettisoning stare deci-
sis would do relatively little to reduce these various uncertainty 
costs.45 On the other hand, a rule allowing ready judicial correction of 
prior mistaken opinions creates a variety of social costs. 46 In general, 
then, enacting legislators would prefer that courts give strong weight 
43. This point may require some explanation. After all, legislators might perceive that 
judges are hostile to certain types of legislation and will therefore construe the legislation nar-
rowly. Thus, they may anticipate that courts will be biased against enforcement (or, for that 
matter, in the opposite direction). But rational legislators, knowing this, will normally draft the 
statute more expansively so as to counter the judicial bias. Provided judges are making a good-
faith (even if biased) attempt to interpret statutes, they will be responsive to sufficiently strong 
statutory language. 
44. Even if legislators do expect judges to be systematically biased but cannot for whatever 
reason compensate for the bias when drafting statutes, they have little reason to favor weakening 
stare decisis rules. If judges are biased in interpreting statutes the first time around, the same 
biases will enter into both their decisions about which issues to rehear and their ultimate deci-
sions after rehearing. Having a biased tribunal hear the same case twice is not a cure for bias. 
45. If courts entirely ignore precedent and treat all statutory interpretation issues as open, 
decisions overruling prior precedents will be about as likely to be wrong as the earlier precedents 
themselves. Unrestrained overruling therefore creates no assurance that courts will ultimately 
settle on the correct interpretation of a statute. If courts overrule precedents only when there are 
strong reasons to believe that the early precedents were wrong, they can increase the chances that 
in the long run statutes will be correctly interpreted. Legislators should regard this as a desirable 
effect, although the magnitude of the benefits will be decreased because of the necessity of dis-
counting such long-range consequences to present value. Legislators would then have to con-
sider the trade-offs between this increase in long-run reliability and the costs associated with 
decreased legal stability. I suspect that the Court's current application of stare decisis is not far 
from the rational legislator's preferred rule. 
46. These social costs are simply the flip side of the policies favoring stare decisis, which arc 
discussed in Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 
744-53 (1988); Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. I, 3-10 
(1979); Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 33-37 
(1987); Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987). Among the social costs are 
the delay and expense of additional litigation, the increased difficulty of transactional planning, a 
October 1988] Interpretation, Inaction, & Civil Rights 13 
to stare decisis in statutory cases, even at the expense of :fidelity to the 
original legislative deal. 
This analysis suggests that legislators' initial stake in having a stat-
ute correctly interpreted is largely dissipated in the "first round" when 
the courts give an initial authoritative interpretation. In the second 
round, when the question is whether to correct an initial mistake, the 
enacting legislator's main interest is in minimizing social costs. In 
other words, the interest of the enacting legislature largely coincides 
with that of society as a whole at the time of the second decision. 
From this perspective, the Court's initial violation of the original un-
derstanding is to some extent a "sunk cost" which is no longer 
relevant. 
Like the citizenry at large, enacting legislators would also ex ante 
prefer courts to give weight to future congressional approval in apply-
ing stare decisis. The reason is that ignoring changing congressional 
attitudes is itself costly. If a later Congress actually approves of the 
Court's original interpretation, an overruling would create several 
kinds of additional social costs. First, congressional disapproval of the 
overruling means that legislative resources will be devoted to consider-
ing the advisability of further legislation. Apart from their monetary 
costs, these hearings and debates carry an opportunity cost in terms of 
Congress' ability to address other issues. The further the amendment 
gets in the legislative process, the higher the costs will be; in general, 
we can expect more extensive congressional activity when Congress 
strongly disapproves of the result. Second, whether or not new legisla-
tion actually results, Congress' disapproval of the overruling creates 
the risk of an amendment. Thus, the Scalia approach creates two 
kinds of uncertainty: First, since judicial decisions of which Congress 
approves are more likely to be overruled under his approach, the level 
of legal uncertainty is increased prior to any actual overruling (even 
when ultimately no overruling results). Second, after the overruling, 
uncertainty will remain high because of the prospect of congressional 
action. In short, a willingness to qverrule decisions even when Con-
gress approves of them entails heightened social costs. Ex ante, legis-
lators would prefer a stare decisis rule that lowers those costs. 
The precedential force to be given statutory precedents is a compli-
general reduction in private compliance with current legal doctrines, and the increased difficulty 
in drafting new legislation against an uncertain legal background. 
It might be thought that making judicial decisions prospective would eliminate these costs, 
but the possibility of a prospective ruling is still a source of uncertainty. Moreover, if statutory 
interpretations were normally prospective, the practical effect would be to delay the implementa- · 
tion of statutes. This would decrease a statute's discounted present value to the enacting legisla-
ture, so legislators would generally reject such a rule. · 
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cated question. The fundamental problem is that of trading off the 
desirability of improved interpretations of statutes against the various 
social costs of legal instability. My purpose here has been the modest 
one of establishing that congressional approval of a precedent ought to 
weigh in its favor, and that silence can be a signal of approval. The 
widely varying settings of cases make it hard to assess in advance just 
how reliably silence signals approval or just how much approval 
should count in the balance. The Patterson setting, however, is unusu-
ally suggestive of actual approval, and further congressional action is a 
realistic likelihood if the Court overrules Runyon. 47 So, subsequent 
congressional silence deserves substantial weight in Patterson. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Patterson order relates 
to the conflicting visions of the majority and dissenters about the 
meaning of principled adjudication. Both dissents emphasize that the 
majority's decision is especially unfortunate because the subject is ra-
cial equality. Justice Blackmun's dissent says that he is "at a loss to 
understand the motivation of five Members of this Court to reconsider 
an interpretation of a civil rights statute that so clearly reflects our 
society's earnest commitment to ending racial discrimination .... "48 
Justice Stevens, in tum, laments the effect of the order on "the faith 
reposed by racial minorities" in the Court's commitment to racial 
justice.49 
In response, the majority argues that the dissenters were seeking 
special advantages for a particular class of litigants, in violation of the 
rule of law: 
Both of the dissents intimate that the statutory question involved in 
Runyon v. McCrary should not be subject to the same principles of stare 
decisis as other decisions because it benefited civil rights plaintiffs by 
expanding liability under the statute. We do not believe that the Court 
may recognize any such exception to the abiding rule that it treat alf 
litigants equally: that is, that the claim of any litigant for the application 
of a rule to its case should not be influenced by the Court's view of the 
worthiness of the litigant in terms of extralegal criteria. We think this is 
what Congress meant when it required each Justice or judge of the 
United States to swear to "administer justice without respect to persons, 
47. Congress has several times amended the civil rights statutes to override restrictive 
Supreme Court interpretations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (overturning General Electric 
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (overturning Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55 (1980)); and most recently, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100· 
259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)). 
48. 108 S. Ct. at 1422. 
49. 108 S. Ct. at 1423. 
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and do equal right to the poor and to the rich .... "50 
This passage seems to resurrect the debate that was sparked almost 
thirty years ago by Herbert Wechsler's classic article on "neutral 
principles. "51 
One view of neutral principles, which was stressed by Wechsler, 
emphasizes the importance of judicial candor.52 Judges should only be 
influenced by considerations that they are willing to explain in their 
opinions and that they are willing to apply in future cases as well. 53 In 
this sense, judicial opinions should be "transparent" in revealing the 
motivation behind the decision. Although it is possible to imagine 
cases in which transparency arguably might not be appropriate, 54 it is 
obviously an important virtue. 
There is little reason to doubt the dissenters' adherence to this 
principle of judicial candor. The dissenters cannot be accused of vio-
lating the transparency principle, since they are quite explicit about 
the basis of their views. They make it clear that they give substantial 
weight to the fact that Runyon favors the cause of racial equality. 
Their real quarrel with the majority is whether this factor is legally 
relevant. If, as they believe, it is legally relevant, they cannot be ac-
cused of violating any norm of judicial neutrality. 
Once the misleading references to the rule of law are cleared away, 
there remains a significant disagreement between the majority and dis-
sent about the criteria relevant to the decision to overrule. The dis-
50. 108 S. Ct. at 1421 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1982)). On one reading, the majority's 
position is clearly correct but beside the point. It is very nearly a tautology to say that the Court 
should not be influenced by "extralegal criteria." A criterion that can rightfully influence a judge 
might very well be termed a "legal criterion" as a matter of definition. On this reading, the 
majority's position is that a court should only be influenced by those factors it should be right-
fully influenced by. Although this proposition is clearly true, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the majority had something more in mind. 
51. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
52. See id. at 19-20, 25-26, 33. For an insightful recent discussion of the importance of 
transparency, see Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). One of 
Alexander Bickel's major criticisms of the Warren Court was that the Court often decided cases 
on the basis of arguments that in reality the Court would not have been willing to apply more 
generally; those arguments consequently could not have been the true basis for decision. See A. 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 44-100 (1970). But Bickel clearly 
did not believe that making value judgments was necessarily inconsistent with the judicial role. 
See, e.g., id. at 77. This concern with transparency is even more evident in A. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
. 
53. For a more jurisprudential discussion of this point, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW 81-83 (1964). As Fuller's discussion shows, the problem of transparency is linked with that 
of generality, because failures of transparency are often linked with spurious attempts to justify 
decisions by appealing to principles that do not in reality form the basis of the decisions. If 
judges did not attempt to give reasoned justifications for their decisions, the problem of trans-
parency would not arise. 
54. See Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 
982, 1006-13 (1978). 
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senters believ.e that it is relevant that a past decision advanced an 
important social goal such as racial equality. The majority apparently 
believes that the Court's view of the societal value of a decision is irrel-
evant. For the majority, overruling a past decision that outlawed ra-
cial discrimination is neither more nor less desirable than overruling a 
past decision concerning price discrimination under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. 
The extent to which judges can properly make value judgments 
involves deep questions going well beyond the scope of this comment. 
My own view is that judges not only can but must make value judg-
ments in hard cases. This apparently was also the view of Professor 
Wechsler, and is probably that of most legal scholars, as Professor 
Kent Greenawalt has explained: 
Wechsler does not contend that judges can decide constitutional cases 
without weighing conflicting values. He explicitly recognizes that judges 
must often make difficult choices among values and he does not suggest 
that the judge can somehow be neutral among those values. 
Some scholars believe that in a deeper sense judges are supposed to 
be neutral among constitutional values, neutral in giving the weight to 
each value that is determined by the Constitution itself or some broader 
set of legal materials. . . . [M]ost modem scholars would be skeptical of 
the claim that the ideal judge could always manage without relying on 
his own value judgments about right social behavior, and Wechsler ad-
vances no such thesis for sitting judges. 55 
In particular, Wechsler said in later correspondence that "[b ]y no pos-
sible reading did I say that the Supreme Court should have cast out of 
its reckoning the likelihood that a decision one way or another would 
effect 'an enduring contribution to the quality of our society.' "56 
Attempts by judges to rely on public values raise some obvious and 
troubling questions.57 The ability of judges to identify enduring values 
may well be questioned. Moreover, the results in many cases may be 
tightly constrained in ways that make reference to broader social val-
ues problematic. In general, judicial reliance on public values becomes 
more troublesome when the judge's value judgments are highly con-
troversial and when the applicable legal rules refer to a very narrow 
range of relevant considerations.58 For example, it is dubious that the 
55. Id. at 991-92 (footnotes omitted). 
56. Id. at 1012 n.92 (quoting letter from H. Wechsler to L. Pollak (Apr. 9, 1962) cited in 
Pollak, Constitutional Adjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, 11 J. Pun. L. 48, 60-61 
(1962)). 
57. Some of these problems are explored in Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 21. 
58. Even when a decision is highly discretionary, the range of factors relevant to that deci· 
sion may be limited in ways that preclude consideration of certain policies. For example, al-
lowing considerations relating to the merits of a ca5e to enter into procedural decisions may well 
be improper (and covertly doing so is even more questionable). See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of 
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application of a jurisdictional time limit should depend on the impor-
tance of the public policies involved in the merits of the case. These 
difficulties in determining the proper scope of public values in judicial 
decisions suggest that judges should be cautious in their reliance on 
such values. 
Patterson is an easy case in at least one respect. If public values are 
relevant at all to the application of stare decisis, the values involved in 
Patterson are both powerful and noncontroversial. 59 There is much 
dispute in our society about how the norm of racial equality should be 
applied in connection with issues such as affirmative action. But the 
core equality norm - that intentional discrimination60 against racial 
minorities is impermissible - is surely not in dispute. 61 
Thus, if public values are ever appropriate considerations in decid-
ing whether to reopen an issue, Patterson is such a case. The more 
interesting issue is whether it actually is appropriate to consider public 
values when deciding whether to overrule a prior decision. The Pat-
terson majority apparently assumed the contrary, but there are sub-
stantial arguments for allowing consideration of public values. 
Rather than being a domain of tightly constraining rules that pre-
clude consideration of broader public values, stare decisis is a largely 
prudential doctrine. 62 In applying the doctrine, courts have looked to 
the "Passive Virtues" -A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1, 10-22 (1964). But the range of factors traditionally considered relevant to stare deci-
sis is sufficiently broad not to preclude consideration of the potential social effects of an 
overruling. 
59. The Patterson majority's unwillingness to consider this public value is disheartening. 
Perhaps the majority's view is that judges in their official capacity should be neutral about values 
like racial equality. Such a conception of the judicial role would be not only profoundly formalis-
tic, but an abandonment of an important part of the Court's institutional role. 
60. Section 1981 only applies to intentional discrimination. General Bldg. Contractors Assn. 
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). 
61. Indeed, the Court has expressly identified this norm as a general public policy applicable 
in matters of statutory construction. In a case that is particularly relevant to Runyon because of 
its subject matter, the Court denied tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools based 
squarely on the Court's determination of public policy. "There can no longer be any doubt," the 
Court said, "that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of 
elementary justice." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983). After review-
ing legislative and executive action regarding racial discrimination, the Court concluded that 
"[w]hatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and however sincere the 
rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy." 461 U.S. at 
595. Justice Powell's concurrence contains a particularly good statement of the exceptional sta-
tus of this public policy. See 461 U.S. at 606, 607 (Powell, J., concurring in part). The Court's 
willingness to rely on this public policy in Bob Jones was especially' striking because doing so 
required considerable stretching of the statutory language. 
62. Our history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain the Court in the disposition 
of cases. Rather, its lesson is that every successful proponent of overruling precedent has 
borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law dictate 
that the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater objective. 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986). 
18 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1 
a wide variety of considerations. These considerations include the ex-
tent to which the prior decision was poorly reasoned or contrary to 
prior precedent, the extent of public reliance on the prior decision, and 
the degree of difficulty encountered in attempting to apply the previ-
ous decision. 63 In making other prudential decisions, such as deter-
mining whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy, judges often 
explicitly refer to the public interest. It is not surprising that some 
leading judges, including Justice Cardozo, have found it appropriate to 
consider the public interest in applying stare decisis. 64 
In defense of the majority opinion, it could be argued that public 
values are relevant, if at all, to the merits of the statutory issue, rather 
than to the stare decisis question. 65 This argument overlooks an im-
portant part of the policy behind stare decisis. Stare decisis is impor-
tant not only because actually overruling decisions imposes social 
costs, but because the prospect of potential overruling itself is a source 
of uncertainty and social costs. 66 The traditional view, at least, is that 
these instability costs are quite large, which is why overrulings are 
exceptional. If we can identify areas in which instability costs seem 
particularly high, we should set the threshold for reconsideration 
higher in these areas. 67 Although we cannot quantify the costs, it is 
reasonable to suppose that instability is particularly costly where ma-
jor social values are threatened. 68 If it is correct that instability costs 
are particularly high in cases involving major social values, 69 overrul-
63. The "art of overruling" is insightfully discussed in Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional 
Law: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 123 (1985). 
64. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-52 (1921). For further 
discussion of this issue, see Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 
46, at 760-62. 
65. Along these lines, it could be argued that considering public values both as an indepen-
dent factor in applying stare decisis and in connection with the underlying claim is a form of 
double counting. Alternatively, if public values are not relevant to the merits, why should they 
count at all in deciding whether to correct a mistake? 
66. Compliance with decisions will be reduced by the possibility of an overruling. Also, 
lawyers will change litigation strategies in ways that may be costly. Most obviously, they will 
litigate whether to overrule cases more often if stare decisis is weak; they will also hedge against 
an overruling by attempting to find additional bases for legal claims. 
67. This is the conventional reason for according unusual weight to stare decisis in property 
law. 
68. Two reasons can be suggested for this conclusion. First, citizens arc more likely to have 
firm expectations under rules that seem uncontroversial. Disappointing these expectations there-
fore creates a greater shock. Second, important social values may also be related to risk aversion. 
We often place a high social value on interests that are also of crucial importance to the individu-
als involved. Moreover, the risks of being deprived of these interests are also hard to avoid by 
diversification. Racial discrimination fits both models: it has a major impact on individual well-
being, and the members of a racial minority are hardly in a position to diversify their "racial 
portfolios." 
69. Since§ 1981 largely duplicates other statutes, it might be argued that overruling Runyon 
would not threaten the major social value in racial equality. Two points can be made in re-
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ings should be made correspondingly more difficult. 70 
Another perspective on this problem emerges from combining 
Parts I and II of this article. In Part I, we saw that statutory construc-
tion often involves both the original understanding and considerations 
of current public policy. In Part II, we saw that the force of the origi-
nal understanding is partially dissipated when the Supreme Court first 
interprets a statute. Public choice theory would suggest that when the 
question is whether to overrule an initial judicial "mistake," even the 
enacting legislators would often put a lower priority on the importance 
of enforcing the original understanding. This necessarily means that 
other considerations, such as enforcing current public policy, should 
play a greater role in the "second round." 
Like the other issues raised by the Patterson rehearing order, the 
"public values" question raises deeper jurisprudential issues, which I 
have not attempted to address. At heart, the issue is the extent to 
which legal texts gain their meaning and authority from the circum-
stances of their making, and the extent to which their authority de-
rives instead from their current place in the fabric of law and their 
current usefulness to society. Even the limited light shed by the analy-
sis presented here, however, is in my view enough to show the com-
plexities and difficulty of the position which the Patterson majority 
seems to have rather impulsively adopted. 
Given the Supreme Court's unique role in the area of racial equal-
ity, it seems unfortunate that the Patterson Court picked a civil rights 
case in which to probe the limits of stare decisis. In any event, from 
the perspective of those who value stability in the law, the Patterson 
order is somewhat disturbing. In his concurring opinion in Runyon, 
Justice Powell said that the dissent's arguments were "quite persua-
sive" but that the argument "comes too late."71 If the argument was 
too late when Powell wrote in 1976, it surely is far too late twelve 
years later. The kinds of criticisms that can be levelled against Run-
yon can be made against many statutory construction decisions; we 
may be in for a rough ride if the Court means to revisit every statutory 
opinion in which the dissent had a cogent argument. 
sponse. First, overruling Runyon could have a substantial effect in the not insignificant area of 
education. Second, per se rules may be useful in reducing uncertainty costs. A per se rule disfa-
voring overrulings in civil rights cases may be useful even if it does not fit every case. 
70. The possibility that major rulings extending the scope of legal rights may be difficult to 
overturn may be a reason for caution in making such rulings in the first place. 
71. Runyon. 427 U.S. at 186. 
